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Abstract
Introduction—Following World Health Organization recommendations set forth in the Global 
Framework for Immunization Monitoring and Surveillance, Costa Rica in 2009 became the first 
country to implement integrated vaccine-preventable disease (iVPD) surveillance, with support 
from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Pan American Health 
Organization (PAHO). As surveillance for diseases prevented by new vaccines is integrated into 
existing surveillance systems, these systems could cost more than routine surveillance for VPDs 
targeted by the Expanded Program on Immunization.
Objectives—We estimate the costs associated with establishing and subsequently operating the 
iVPD surveillance system at a pilot site in Costa Rica.
Methods—We retrospectively collected data on costs incurred by the institutions supporting 
iVPD surveillance during the preparatory (January 2007 through August 2009) and 
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implementation (September 2009 through August 2010) phases of the iVPD surveillance project 
in Costa Rica. These data were used to estimate costs for personnel, meetings, infrastructure, 
office equipment and supplies, transportation, and laboratory facilities. Costs incurred by each of 
the collaborating institutions were also estimated.
Results—During the preparatory phase, the estimated total cost was 128,000 U.S. dollars (US$), 
including 64% for personnel costs. The preparatory phase was supported by CDC and PAHO. The 
estimated cost for 1 year of implementation was US$ 420,000, including 58% for personnel costs, 
28% for laboratory costs, and 14% for meeting, infrastructure, office, and transportation costs 
combined. The national reference laboratory and the PAHO Costa Rica office incurred 64% of 
total costs, and other local institutions supporting iVPD surveillance incurred the remaining 36%.
Conclusions—Countries planning to implement iVPD surveillance will require adequate 
investments in human resources, laboratories, data management, reporting, and investigation. Our 
findings will be valuable for decision makers and donors planning and implementing similar 
strategies in other countries.
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1. Introduction
Given the increasing availability and introduction of new vaccines in the developing world, 
accurate assessments of disease burden and vaccination impact will be necessary. Systems 
that integrate surveillance for diseases prevented by new vaccines such as rotavirus, 
influenza, Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib), and Streptococcus pneumoniae 
(pneumococcus) with existing surveillance systems for polio, measles, rubella, diphtheria, 
and tetanus are needed to maintain support and long-term sustainability of vaccination 
programs.
In 2007, the World Health Organization published the Global Framework for Immunization 
Monitoring and Surveillance (GFIMS), which outlines recommendations for ministries of 
health to enhance national surveillance of vaccine-preventable diseases (VPDs) [1]. Rather 
than implementing new disease-specific and vertical VPD surveillance systems, the GFIMS 
recommends that VPD surveillance be placed in a “unified framework” that builds upon the 
strengths of existing surveillance systems. The goals of an integrated VPD (iVPD) 
surveillance system are to identify and capitalize on the efficiencies of combining 
surveillance systems and disease surveillance objectives and to reduce costs by eliminating 
duplication of efforts while providing quality surveillance.
2. Implementation of iVPD surveillance in Costa Rica
In 2009, Costa Rica was the first country to implement iVPD surveillance following the 
GFIMS. The Costa Rica Ministry of Health (MoH) coordinated the initiative, with technical 
assistance from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Pan American 
Health Organization (PAHO) headquarters, and the PAHO Costa Rica office. The planning 
and preparation for iVPD surveillance implementation (the preparatory phase of the project) 
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took place from January 2007 to August 2009; activities during this project phase included a 
series of meetings to prepare the standardized surveillance protocol as well as training 
materials and sessions for personnel. In September 2009, the iVPD surveillance system 
began operating in a single pilot sentinel hospital, the Hospital San Vicente de Paúl (HSVP), 
so that experience could be gained before expanding to other sites. At this site, iVPD 
surveillance was incorporated into existing VPD surveillance.
Before implementation of iVPD surveillance, VPD surveillance in Costa Rica included 
syndromic surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP), febrile rash, and influenza-like 
illnesses along with surveillance for tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis in all health care 
facilities in the country. Nationwide passive surveillance for AFP and febrile rash was 
conducted in all health care facilities with the objective of tracking progress toward meeting 
disease eradication and elimination goals. Sentinel surveillance for influenza-like illnesses 
was based in outpatient clinics and emergency rooms to monitor circulating strains and 
detect outbreaks.
During the implementation of iVPD, sentinel syndromic surveillance for bacterial meningitis 
(Hib, pneumococcus, meningococcus), severe diarrhea (rotavirus), and severe acute 
respiratory illnesses (SARI) (pertussis, influenza, Hib, pneumococcus) was incorporated into 
the existing VPD surveillance networks. Hyde and colleagues provide more detailed 
information on the development and implementation of the iVPD surveillance system [2].
HSVP, a 250-bed public hospital managed by Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (Social 
Security Fund of Costa Rica [CCSS]), is the only hospital in the province of Heredia 
(estimated population: 450,000), a metropolitan area of the country. The hospital laboratory 
performs bacterial isolation and identification and rotavirus rapid diagnostic testing. The 
national reference laboratory, Instituto Costarricense de Investigación y Enseñanza en 
Nutrición y Salud (Costa Rican Institute for Research and Training on Nutrition and Health 
[INCIENSA]), located in the country’s capital, performs diagnostic testing for viral diseases 
and serotyping of selected bacterial agents. INCIENSA receives specimens and isolates 
from HSVP daily.
The Costa Rica MoH is responsible for the general coordination of iVPD surveillance; 
CCSS, which is responsible for health care for the population covered by the social security 
health system (approximately 90% of the population), provides oversight of iVPD 
surveillance. INCIENSA is under the jurisdiction of the MoH. CDC and PAHO provided 
technical and financial support for establishing iVPD surveillance.
3. Processing of specimens
When HSVP identifies a suspected VPD case, the health care provider completes a 
standardized case report form, enters clinical and epidemiological information about the 
patient into a standardized electronic spreadsheet, and obtains the appropriate specimens 
according to the presenting clinical syndrome (Table 1). All patients <5 years of age who 
present with a severe acute respiratory illness undergo an on-site chest radiograph.
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Depending on the type of testing and etiologic agents considered in the differential diagnosis 
(Table 1), the HSVP laboratory or INCIENSA tests the specimens. A single specimen from 
a person with a suspected VPD may be tested for one or more etiologic agents according to 
the surveillance protocol. Some of the differential diagnoses considered are not VPDs, 
including dengue, respiratory syncitial virus, adenovirus, and parainfluenza virus.
To better understand the resources required for iVPD surveillance, we analyzed the costs of 
establishing and implementing iVPD surveillance at a pilot site in Costa Rica. We believe 
these cost data will help to evaluate the pilot program itself, stimulate the development of 
new and efficient ways to carry out program activities, and plan future program needs, 
budget allocation, and fundraising. Finally, program cost data will aid in analyses of the 
cost-effectiveness of iVPD surveillance in Costa Rica and will provide valuable cost 
information for other countries and regions planning such surveillance.
4. Methods
We included retrospectively collected cost data from each of the participating institutions 
that supported iVPD surveillance in Costa Rica, recorded all cost data in local currency units 
(Costa Rican colones), and converted the figures to U.S. dollars (US$) using the mean 2009 
annual exchange rate of 573 Costa Rican colones per U.S. dollar [3]. We adjusted all costs 
to 2010 U.S. dollar equivalents.
We collected data on all resources used in the process of establishing and implementing 
iVPD surveillance activities, including capital costs (one-time purchases) and recurrent 
(ongoing) costs, for the preparatory phase (January 2007 through August 2009) and the first 
year of the implementation phase (September 2009 through August 2010). Preparatory 
phase costs are one-time costs incurred during the project, while those associated with the 
implementation phase are annual costs required each year for ongoing iVPD surveillance. 
For the implementation phase, we present costs per 100,000 population.
Costs incurred at the country level included national-level (MoH, CCSS, and INCIENSA) 
costs and sentinel hospital (HSVP) costs. Costs incurred by international institutions 
supporting surveillance (PAHO headquarters, the PAHO Costa Rica office, and CDC) were 
also included. The investigators collected primary cost data at the country level during 
October 2010 through January 2011, when each institution compiled resource utilization and 
costing data, followed by a 1-week additional data collection period during February 2011, 
when the rest of the data were collected and verified.
For each institution, we categorized resources as personnel, infrastructure, office equipment 
and supplies, transportation, laboratory facilities, or meetings. We did not consider 
information system support and maintenance costs, as no specific system was established for 
iVPD surveillance. We reviewed documents related to iVPD surveillance activities and 
conducted interviews with key staff to ascertain CDC and PAHO cost data. In the final 
costing results, we report CDC and PAHO donations to laboratory institutions involved in 
iVPD surveillance in Costa Rica as costs from the laboratory institution performing the 
activity.
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We determined personnel costs by collecting data on the number of staff persons, including 
their annual remuneration, and by interviewing staff at each institution to estimate the time 
dedicated to iVPD surveillance. We apportioned total personnel costs attributable to iVPD 
surveillance according to the ratio of staff time allocated to iVPD relative to all other 
activities. Remuneration packages include base salary and any benefit packages, such as 
those for dangerous/risky activities, exclusive work at the institution, certain career paths, 
and length of service; a 1-month salary bonus at the end of every year; a retirement 
contribution (9.17% of the employee’s salary); and support for children at school.
With respect to meeting costs, we considered all meetings, including routine and one-time 
training sessions, during both the preparatory and implementation phases and recorded the 
number of participants, by institution, at each of the meetings. For international travel, we 
included costs of airfare and per diems; for local travel, we calculated approximate costs by 
multiplying average per diem estimates by the number of meeting days.
We classified infrastructure, office, transportation, and laboratory costs as either capital or 
operational costs. Capital costs are typically one-time expenditures on buildings, vehicles, 
laboratory, and office equipment that will be used over a period of time. We applied an 
annual 5% depreciation rate to buildings, vehicles, and office and laboratory equipment over 
50-year, 10-year, and 5-year useful-life time horizons, respectively. We assumed the scrap 
value of the capital items at the end of their useful life to be zero. Operational costs included 
costs for supplies, utilities, security, maintenance, and repairs. We multiplied total capital 
and operational costs by estimated fractions of costs attributable to iVPD surveillance.
Capital infrastructure costs are building or office/laboratory space costs. Operational 
infrastructure costs include costs for utilities (communication, electricity, water, and 
cleaning), security, maintenance, and repairs.
We estimated current market values for building and spaces and computed the estimated 
attributable iVPD surveillance fraction for capital costs by dividing the number of full-time-
equivalent (FTE) surveillance staff by the total staff in the building or as a percentage of the 
building area occupied by surveillance FTE staff.
We also estimated annual operational costs and computed the estimated attributable fraction 
for operational costs by dividing the number of FTE surveillance staff by the total staff in 
the building (or total staff in the country, if building-specific costs were not available). We 
then multiplied total capital and operational costs by estimated cost fractions attributable to 
iVPD surveillance to estimate annual operational costs.
We calculated the costs of office equipment and supplies used for iVPD surveillance. We 
derived separate estimates of bacteriology and virology laboratory costs for INCIENSA and 
of epidemiology and laboratory costs for HSVP.
We derived transportation costs from the capital costs of vehicles (the percentage of days 
per year the vehicle was used for iVPD surveillance activities) and operational costs, which 
we calculated by estimating an average fuel consumption of 4.5 l of gasoline per round trip 
(assuming an average distance of 45 km and a fuel economy figure of 10 km/l of gasoline) at 
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an average cost of 588 Costa Rican colones/l of gasoline. We also included estimated costs 
of insurance, taxes, and maintenance. We estimated costs for transportation by taxi using 
information on the number of trips and the average taxi fare for each destination. We 
computed operational (fuel) costs as the product of fuel consumption, average distance, and 
number of trips. We included the costs for transporting clinical specimens from HSVP to 
INCIENSA in hospital transportation costs, assuming one daily round trip, and included the 
costs for shipment of specimens from Costa Rica to the regional reference laboratory in the 
calculation of PAHO transportation.
Laboratory costs included costs related to laboratory equipment, laboratory and medical 
supplies, and chest X-rays. For high-value laboratory equipment (valued at more than US
$5000), the exact year of purchase was used if this information was available. We assumed 
that all other equipment items were purchased in 2008. We multiplied total laboratory 
equipment costs by the estimated fraction of cost attributable to iVPD surveillance, which 
was estimated as the number of FTE laboratory staff dedicated to iVPD surveillance divided 
by the total laboratory staff. We used current market prices to estimate the cost of donated 
equipment and supplies. Laboratory costs included the cost of testing for all etiologic 
diagnostic agents considered in relation to the syndromes under surveillance (Table 1).
To determine the cost of medical supplies, we initially estimated the number of respiratory, 
blood, and stool samples collected and then used this estimate to itemize the number of 
medical supplies required for collection of these specimens. Next, we multiplied this figure 
by the individual cost of the supply item. We assumed that all patients with a suspected 
severe acute respiratory illness underwent a chest radiograph, at an estimated cost of US$26 
(30% of the private-sector cost).
We then stratified all estimated costs by activity or cost components, the institution bearing 
the cost, whether the cost was capital or operational, and whether it was associated with the 
preparation phase or the implementation phase. For INCIENSA, we further stratified the 
costs by bacteriology and virology; for HSVP, we stratified costs according to 
epidemiology, laboratory, and medical supplies (for sample collection).
We used Microsoft Excel to compile and analyze the data. For the preparatory phase, we 
estimated the costs for personnel and meetings. For the implementation phase, we estimated 
costs for all of the major categories described above, disaggregated by capital and 
operational costs.
5. Results
The total cost for the preparatory phase of Costa Rica’s iVPD surveillance system was US
$128,101, US$82,000 (64%) for personnel and US$46,101 (36%) for meeting airfares and 
per diems.
The total cost for a single year of iVPD surveillance implementation was US$422,149: US
$245,736 (58%) for personnel costs, US$ 117,674 (28%) for laboratory costs, and US$ 
58,379 (14%) for the remaining cost categories (meetings, infrastructure, office, 
transportation). Institutional costs included US$153,689 (36%) for INCIENSA, US$117,675 
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(28%) for the PAHO Costa Rica office, US$70,100 (17%) for CCSS, and US$69,781 (17%) 
for HSVP (Table 2). Considering the population covered by the iVPD surveillance system, 
the estimated cost was US$91,846 per 100,000 population.
Costs by major categories and by cost-bearing institution, disaggregated by capital and 
operational costs, are presented in Table 2. Personnel costs represented the greatest 
proportion (58%) of iVPD surveillance implementation costs, which were borne entirely by 
national Costa Rican institutions. PAHO Costa Rica office personnel costs accounted for 
41% of total personnel costs.
Laboratory-related costs represented 28% of total costs. INCIENSA was responsible for 
81% (US$94,815) of total laboratory costs, among which 94% were costs associated with 
laboratory supplies. Supplies donated by PAHO headquarters and CDC (influenza, rotavirus, 
measles, and rubella diagnostic kits and polymerase chain reaction testing for influenza) 
accounted for 23% (US$16,650) of INCIENSA virology laboratory supply costs. CDC also 
contributed US$2700 to HSVP for a refrigerator and consumables (e.g., sheep blood agar), 
accounting for 10% of laboratory costs.
Among the 762 clinical specimens collected and tested, 14 cases of influenza A, 51 cases of 
pertussis, 13 cases of rotavirus diarrhea, and 2 cases of bacteremic pneumonia (1 due to S. 
pneumoniae and 1 due to H. influenzae type e) were detected and diagnosed by the iVPD 
surveillance system (Table 3), in addition to other non-VPD differential etiologies 
considered in the diagnostic procedures. Costs per confirmed and suspected cases were 
estimated at US$2069 and US$762, respectively.
The remaining costs included costs associated with transportation (5%), infrastructure (4%), 
meetings (3%), and office equipment and supplies (2%). CDC was responsible for 45% of 
total meeting costs and did not directly support other activities during the implementation 
phase.
In the case of all cost categories for which operational and capital costs were estimated (i.e., 
infrastructure, office, and transportation costs), operational costs were more significant than 
capital costs.
Considering all institutions funding the implementation of iVPD surveillance in Costa Rica, 
the largest cost share was attributed to INCIENSA (36.5%), followed by the PAHO Costa 
Rica office (28%); CCSS and HSVP were each responsible for 16.5% of the total. PAHO 
headquarters, CDC, the Costa Rica MoH, and other Costa Rica agencies combined were 
responsible for a very small portion of iVPD surveillance funding.
6. Discussion
Surveillance system costs are difficult to quantify because they are generally shared with 
other programs and encompass a broad range of activities. The benefits of surveillance 
systems are also not easy to quantify, as the impact on the health of a population is indirect 
[4].
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It is unlikely that a universal, fully integrated surveillance system appropriate for all diseases 
is possible, because of the inherent differences in surveillance objectives and methods for 
different diseases. Nonetheless, planners can efficiently integrate many elements of a 
surveillance system; Costa Rica’s iVPD surveillance system succeeded in integrating 
multiple VPDs into an existing surveillance platform. Integrated surveillance systems 
require adequate infrastructure, and Costa Rica has a number of characteristics that 
facilitated implementation of iVPD surveillance, including the availability of national 
sustainable funding for immunization and VPD surveillance, the existence of laboratory 
capacity, and a functional VPD surveillance platform.
To our knowledge, very few studies have included cost analyses of surveillance systems 
[5-7], and ours is the first study reporting the costing of an iVPD surveillance system. 
Although available surveillance system costing studies are not directly comparable to ours, 
personnel and laboratory costs also represent the major cost components in these studies 
[5-7].
7. Conclusion
Our evaluation demonstrated that the costs incurred during the preparatory phase of the 
project, costs that are usually not captured or reported, were considerable. As expected, 
personnel costs accounted for the largest share of costs during the implementation phase. It 
is important to account for the high labor benefit packages offered by employers in Latin 
American countries, which result in higher personnel costs than in countries with lower 
benefit packages. Laboratory costs accounted for the second largest share, and these costs 
are particularly important in syndromic surveillance systems in which laboratory diagnostic 
testing for various etiologic agents in a variety of clinical specimens is performed, as is the 
case with surveillance for many of the diseases prevented by newer vaccines and their 
differential diagnoses. Thus, such surveillance systems require more laboratory resources 
and a larger budget share than non-integrated systems for the laboratory component of 
surveillance. Among the various institutions supporting iVPD surveillance, costs borne by 
INCIENSA were highest, including personnel, equipment, supplies, and other cost 
components. This finding is similar to results reported by other authors [7].
One limitation of this study is that we did not estimate baseline costs of existing VPD 
surveillance before implementation of iVPD surveillance. Also, iVPD surveillance was 
implemented not at the national level but as a pilot in a sentinel hospital. Finally, we did not 
consider the cost-effectiveness of the system. As modeled and discussed in an earlier study 
[8], we believe that integrated surveillance systems can improve the cost-effectiveness of 
public health surveillance.
Our findings provide information and guidance to other countries and regions considering 
implementation of integrated VPD surveillance, as well as donors, immunization partners, 
policymakers, and decision-makers. A commitment of national and international resources 
to public health surveillance systems will be required as other countries and regions plan to 
implement integrated VPD surveillance. These systems will require investments to 
strengthen national capacities in terms of human resources, laboratories, data management, 
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reporting, and epidemic response. It is expected that such investments will yield higher 
surveillance quality. Results from this evaluation could provide data inputs for a cost-
effectiveness analysis of iVPD surveillance in Costa Rica; we suggest using these data to 
implement such studies as a means of providing evidence to support decision-making on 
investing in integrated VPD surveillance systems.
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Rodrigo Rodriguez, Lucia H. Oliveira, Jon Andrus; U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC): Maya Vijayaraghavan, Terri Hyde, Carla Lee, Marc-Alain Widdowson, 
Jennifer Verani, Cindy Friedman, Eduardo Azziz-Baumgartner, Adriana Lopez, Aisha 
Jumaan, Vance Dietz; Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), Costa Rica: Isabel 
Fernández Vargas, Vicenta Machado Cruz; Vice Minister of Health, Costa Rica: Ana 
Morice; Ministerio de Salud, Costa Rica: Hilda Ma. Salazar Bolaños, Maria Ethel Trejos 
Solórzano, Jorge Arturo Solano López; Instituto Costarricense de Investigación y Enseñanza 
en Nutrición y Salud (INCIENSA): Elena Campos Chacón, Grettel Chanto Chacón, Hilda 
Ma. Bolaños Acuña, Elizabeth Sáenz Bolaños, Jenny Lara Araya, Ana Isela Ruiz González, 
Germán Picado García; Hospital Saint Vincent de Paúl (HSVP), Costa Rica: Tatiana 
Barrantes Solís, Gonzalo Salvador Zúñiga, Steven Campos Sáenz, Jorge Chacón De La O.
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Table 1
Syndromes and age groups targeted for surveillance, samples collected for each syndrome, and processing of 
specimens: integrated vaccine-preventable disease surveillance system, Costa Rica, September 2009–August 
2010.





























































aspirate, blood, chest X-ray
Immunofluorescence,
PCR, viral isolation
Note. PCR: polymerase chain reaction; ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay.
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Table 3
Numbers ofsamples processed and positive laboratory results, by etiology: integrated vaccine-preventable 
disease surveillance system, Costa Rica.
Clinical syndrome Specimen Suspected etiology No. samples tested Confirmed etiology No. (%) positive
Severe acute
respiratory illness Respiratory Influenza 240 Influenza type A 14 (5.8)
Adenovirus 27 (11.3)
Parainfluenza type 3 4 (1.7)
Respiratory syncitial virus 91 (37.9)
Respiratory Pertussis 231 B. pertussis 51 (22.1)
Blood Bacteremic pneumonia 186 H. influenzae type e 1 (0.5)
S. pneumoniae type 14 1 (0.5)
Bacterial meningitis Cerebrospinal fluid Bacterial meningitis 7 S. agalactiae 
a 1 (14.3)
Rash and fever illness Serum Dengue 42 Dengue 1 (2.4)
Severe acute diarrhea Stool Rotavirus 47 Rotavirus 13 (27.7)
Acute flaccid paralysis Stool Poliovirus 9 None 0 (0.0)
a
Group B Streptococcus.
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